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Abstract 
In recent years, the threat of international attacks on critical infrastructure networks has 
grown; as defined by a 1998 Presidential Decision Directive, these are networks 
necessary to society’s functionality and include water, power, communication, 
transportation, and more. Due to existing interdependencies, damage to a small area of 
one of the networks could have far-reaching effects on the ability to meet demand 
across the entire system. In similar work, common scenarios for malevolent attacks 
include degree- and capacity-based disruptions. However, attackers targeting a network 
may consider some components more desirable than others for qualitative reasons such 
as religious or governmental significance. Additionally, the concept of social 
vulnerability, which describes an area’s ability to prepare for and respond to a 
disruption, must be included. This should promote not only the protection of the most 
at-risk components but also ensure that socially vulnerable communities are given 
adequate resources. This work attempts to determine the allocation of defensive 
resources that accounts for all these factors while minimizing both costs and the unmet 
demand in the disrupted network. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Motivation 
Over the past 50 years, more than 2,500 foreign and domestic terrorist attacks have 
occurred in the United States. Understandably, high-fatality attacks on visible public 
targets such as the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building bombing in Oklahoma City, the 
attacks on 9/11, and the mass shooting at Pulse nightclub in Orlando garner more 
attention and make a larger memorable impact on society. However, these types of 
attacks only account for 10-20% of the total; the majority are non-lethal but 
nevertheless can cause significant economic and psychological damage to the nation. In 
a recent report for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism classifies attack by 
target type and shows that 75% of attacks focus on the critical infrastructure sector 
(Miller, 2016). 
From this report, it is clear that there is significant risk of disruptive events 
affecting U.S. infrastructure. As defined by the Presidential Decision Directives 
regarding Critical Infrastructure Protection, critical infrastructures are networks are 
service and utility systems that are considered necessary for society to function. Critical 
infrastructure includes energy, water, transportation, and communication systems, 
among many others on which all aspects of our society—from the public, to the 
government and businesses—depend. With the growth of technology in recent years, 
the definition of critical infrastructure networks has expanded to include cyber-based 
systems. While these advances, and the desire to make such networks more efficient, 
have improved the overall system functionality, they come at a cost and “have created 
new vulnerabilities to equipment failure, human error, weather and other natural causes, 
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and physical and cyber attacks. Addressing these vulnerabilities will necessarily require 
flexible, evolutionary approaches” to ensure that both the infrastructure itself and the 
population in potentially at-risk areas are protected (PDD 63, 1998). This problem 
stated in the Directive nearly 20 years ago is even more pressing today, as higher 
degrees of connectivity and communication have made networks interdependent. 
Interdependency is defined in Rinaldi et al. (2001) as a “bidirectional relationship 
between two infrastructures through which the state of each infrastructure influences or 
is correlated to the state of the other;” the relationship between components of different 
networks increases the complexity of the network system as a whole. 
Due to the existing interdependencies, damage to a section of one infrastructure 
network could have far-reaching effects on other networks in the system; high 
vulnerability in even a small number of components has significant negative potential. 
To combat this vulnerability, a defensive strategy that concentrates on susceptible 
components can be implemented, increasing the overall resilience of the system of 
networks.  
This research aims to provide a framework that decision makers can use to 
determine the allocation of defensive resources that is robust to a variety of disruption 
scenarios. It considers a system of multiple interdependent networks subjected to the 
disruptions and optimizes a multi-objective mathematical model to determine allocation 
options that reduce both vulnerability (represented by unmet demand) and cost. 
The composition of this is paper is as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the 
background of the problem, citing previous works that contributed to the work 
presented here. Chapter 3 details the methodology and model formulation, while 
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Chapter 4 demonstrated how the model can be applied to an example network system 
under disruptions. Lastly, Chapter 5 provides concluding remarks on the results from 
the example and offers recommendations for future work.  
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Chapter 2: Background 
This section discusses some of the prior work on topics related to those presented in this 
paper. 
2.1 Interdependent Networks 
As the prevalence and importance of interdependent infrastructure networks grows, 
more and more researchers are concentrating on increasing system resilience in the face 
of significant disruptive events. Almoghathawi et al. (2016) describes a system of 
interdependent critical infrastructure subjected to a range of disruption scenarios: 
random failure, spatial failure, and malevolent attacks, which are either degree- or 
capacity-based. The goal of this work is to determine a strategy to restore the networks 
in a post-disruption period dependent on the availability of resources such as work 
crews and time. The multi-objective model minimizes flow, disruption, and restoration 
costs while maximizing resilience. For simplification, the 𝜖-constraint method is used 
for the latter objective; the model is then solved for the cost objective for multiple 
values of 𝜖 ∈ [0,1]. In addition to the resource constraints, the system of networks is 
also subject to flow, capacity, and interdependency constraints (Almoghathawi et al., 
2016).  
González et al. (2015) uses a similar formulation for the interdependent network 
system but a different approach to finding the optimal restoration strategy. The model 
still incorporates constraints regulating costs, operations, flow, and interdependence, but 
also takes advantage of the interdependencies to allow for simultaneous restoration 
processes. The Interdependent Network Design Problem (INDP) developed is then used 
as input for an iterative algorithm to generate reconstruction solutions at the minimum 
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cost (González et al., 2015). This research also considers various types of 
interdependencies that could be present in the critical infrastructure: physical, cyber, 
geographical, and logical. Understanding the nature in which the individual networks 
are connected is valuable for deeper contextual analysis of the problem and how the 
different interdependence types may affect the recovery process.  
2.2 Network Allocation  
In both works discussed above, the focus is on the period after the given disruption and 
restoring system functionality. However, the period prior to a disruption is also a key 
point in disaster planning; implementing accurate preventative measures can reduce the 
performance loss experienced in the network(s). One instance of this problem is 
addressed in Qiao et al (2005); the work examines the scenario of a water supply 
network under a physical, cyber, or biological attack. In this case, the desired output is 
the optimal allocation of a security budget across the single network. Assuming the 
attacker has knowledge of the network and will target components whose disruption 
will cause the most damage, the defender allocates resources so that the attack will be 
more costly to carry out. That is, the defenders aim to maximize the resilience of the 
system where a component is defined as resilient if the “consequences that result from 
the attack are small in comparison to the attack cost” (Qiao et al 2005). They achieve 
this by employing a linear programming model whose objective function maximizes the 
minimum network resilience. This research is tailored to the water network, as it 
incorporates hydraulic modeling and constraints specifically for water flow and pressure 
and across pipes (links) in the system. However, the general ideas behind the 
methodology can be applied to a broader range of network allocation problems.  
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McCarter et al. (2017) expands the allocation problem presented in Qiao et al by 
looking at multi-commodity networks (as opposed to the single-commodity water 
network). Five disruption scenarios were randomly generated and applied to the 
network; for each scenario 𝑘 ∈ [1,5], link (𝑖, 𝑗) is subjected to 𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑘  units of attack 
resource. and the decision variables are the components of defense strategy 𝒉𝑙. The set 
of strategies that minimize allocation cost and vulnerability (or maximize network 
performance) is found with the Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II. The 
solutions in the Pareto set are then evaluated with the Technique for Order of Preference 
by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) using as criteria the cost and the network 
performance in each scenario.  
2.3 Contest Functions 
As McCarter et al. (2017) demonstrates, the vulnerability of a component in a network 
subjected to some disruption scenario can be found using a contest function. In general, 
contest functions are used when multiple players exert effort to win a prize. This can 
include events such as elections, sports games, and military combat (Baik, 1998). The 
outcome of the function 𝑝 ∈ (0,1) can either represent the probability that a player wins 
the prize or the percentage of the prize a player wins, depending on the nature of the 
prize and event for which the function is employed (Hirshleifer, 1989). Multiple forms 
of contest functions have been developed over the years and research has shown some 
to be more applicable to some circumstances over others. Considering malevolent 
attacks, the two most common contest functions are the ratio form and difference form 
(Levitin and Hausken, 2010). Both forms take as input the amount of attack and defense 
resources assigned to a given component. The value of the output is dependent on how 
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the relation between the attack and defense amounts is defined in the function; it is 
either based on the ratio of the two inputs or the magnitude of difference between them.  
2.4 Terrorist Target Selection 
The works above have shown multiple different ways to consider disruption scenarios. 
However, studies in terrorist target selection suggest that attackers do not always choose 
what defenders typically think of as the logical choice; that is, the components of a 
system that are most important to network throughput. In allocating resources planners 
must be aware not only of which components are most critical to the functionality of the 
infrastructure as a whole but also which components might be more attractive to an 
attacker. The likelihood that a given component will be included in an intentional attack 
is based on several factors, some more qualitative than others. Toft et al. (2010) 
conducted a study into the risk of terrorist attacks on energy networks and created a 
framework to analyze and categorize motivations from attack data collected in the 
Global Terrorism Database and the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System. The study 
suggests that there is a wide range of objectives and strategic value may be less 
important that other factors such as symbolism, political or religious ideology, 
feasibility, and intimidation.   
On the other hand, an examination into the motivations behind the 2005 attacks 
on the London underground transportation system revealed that the stations targeted 
were those associated with the highest flow capacity in terms of passengers (Jordán 
2008). Jordán does acknowledge that causing panic and casualties or targeting locations 
of symbolic value are also motivations, and the goals vary across attacks and terrorist 
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groups. In any case, the defenders need to weigh the functional value against the 
attackers’ values to gain a fuller understanding of which components are at-risk.  
2.5 Social Vulnerability 
Another aspect less frequently discussed in disaster planning and resilience is that of 
social vulnerability. Social vulnerability describes how social factors and inequalities, 
such as economic disparities, access to emergency services, and political representation, 
affect a community’s ability to respond to and recover from some disruptive event 
(Cutter et al., 2003). Within the contest of critical infrastructure systems, socially 
vulnerable areas are those that will be most negatively impacted by a lack of critical 
services and resources over the disruption time. However, until recently it has been 
largely excluded from resilience and recovery research partially because of the greater 
focus on physical and cyber vulnerabilities. Additionally, the numerous factors that 
contribute to social vulnerability make quantification complicated.  
To address this, the Cutter et al. (2003) and University of South Carolina’s 
Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute developed a method to assign a Social 
Vulnerability Index (SoVI) score across the United States by county using 
demographic, housing, and economic data publicly available through the U.S. Census 
(Cutter et al., 2003). While the most recent version of the SoVI model implements 
Principal Component Analysis to determine the influence of 29 variables, the research 
presented in this paper uses a simplified method called SoVI-Lite developed for the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) as a quicker, less technical method 
for hazard planners (Cutter el al., 2011). SoVI-Lite also allows for the index to be more 
easily scaled down to determine scores within smaller geographical units for an 
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individual county and uses a smaller set of variables determined to be the most relevant 
to the specific USACE region of study. Resulting SoVI scores can then be used as 
objectives or weights in resilience models to ensure that more vulnerable areas are 
allocated the necessary prevention or restoration resources.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
The research presented in this paper, incorporating and combining concepts from the 
works in the previous section, fills a gap in the current literature by applying the 
vulnerability-reducing resource allocation formulation from McCarter et al. (2017) to an 
interdependent network system as presented in Almoghathawi et al. (2016). 
Furthermore, this work also considers the intentional attack scenario based on 
qualitative motivators and includes community resilience metrics to lower the impact of 
a disruption on society. The following section explains the types disruption scenarios, 
how concepts of resilience and social vulnerability are incorporated, the variables and 
parameters for the interdependent networks, and the mathematical model that aims to 
minimize the effects of the disruption while simultaneously minimizing costs. 
3.1 Resilience and Vulnerability 
In the field of disaster planning and recovery, the term resilience can take on a variety 
of meanings. This research employs the framework adapted from Barker et al. (2013) 
and Henry and Ramirez-Marquez (2012), shown below in Figure 1. The figure shows 
the state of the network in the time before, during, and after some disruptive event 𝑒𝑘. 
Here resilience is a function of vulnerability, the amount the network performance 𝜑(𝑡) 
decreases in the disruption period, and of recoverability, how long it takes for the 
system to return to acceptable performance 𝜑(𝑡𝑓) after experiencing the disrupted state. 
The model developed in this paper focuses on decreasing vulnerability by enacting 
preemptive defensive measures prior to the disruptive event (between 𝑡0 and 𝑡𝑒) and is 
therefore independent of time. 
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Figure 1: Network performance over time 
3.2 Proposed Disruption Scenarios 
Wang et al. (2013) categorized disruptive events into three types: natural disasters, 
malevolent attacks, and random failure. This work proposes three disruption scenarios 
that fall under the second category and represent different possible target selection 
motivations from the perspective of the attacker: degree-based, capacity-based, and 
desirability-based. In degree-based attacks, the defender assumes the attacker will focus 
on components with a high degree of connections to other nodes or links in the network. 
The degree of an individual node 𝑖 is simply the number of connections (number of 
links in and out of 𝑖) and the degree of a link (𝑖, 𝑗) is the average of the degrees of nodes 
𝑖 and 𝑗. In capacity-based attacks, the attacker targets components with greater 
capacities. For links, this quantity is the flow capacity across the link. The capacity of a 
node its supply/demand value; for transshipment nodes whose given capacity is zero we 
use the minimum between the sum of the node’s outgoing links’ capacities and its 
incoming links’ capacities (𝑐𝑖
𝑘 = min {∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑖
𝑘, ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑙
𝑘
(𝑖,𝑙)∈𝐿𝑘(𝑗,𝑖)∈𝐿𝑘 }). For the last scenario, 
desirability-based attacks, components are assigned a rank of external importance to 
represent how desirable they are to the attacker, supposing that the attacker may value 
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some targets over others for more qualitative, symbolic significance. Due to limited 
knowledge about the network regarding which components are associated with greater 
symbolic and ideological values, the components are assigned a rank to approximate the 
likelihood of attack (high, moderate or low). The majority of nodes selected for the third 
scenario were in the “high likelihood” category, though some were also chosen from the 
“moderate” and “low” categories to represent the high degree of unpredictability in 
attacker motivation. In each of the three scenarios, 25% of the nodes and 20% of the 
links were disrupted.  
3.3 Definitions and Notations 
The mathematical model below defines components for K interdependent networks. 𝑁𝑘 
and 𝐿𝑘 are the total sets of all the nodes and links, respectively, in each individual 
network. Within the sets of nodes and links, 𝑁𝑘𝑠 and 𝑁𝑘𝑑 are the subsets of supply and 
demand nodes and 𝑁𝑘′ and 𝐿𝑘′ are the subsets of disrupted nodes and links. The flow on 
each link from any node 𝑖 to any node 𝑗 in network 𝑘 is defined as 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑘  and has a capacity 
of 𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑘 . For all nodes 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑘𝑠, the available supply, and subsequently the maximum 
possible flow from node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑘𝑠 to node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑘𝑑 is 𝑏𝑖
𝑘. Using this definition, 𝑏𝑖
𝑘 is a 
maximum performance amount representing the desired amount of demand to be met at 
node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑘𝑑. For all nodes 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑘𝑑 , the reduction from this maximum flow, or slack, 
is 𝑠𝑖
𝑘 and has an associated unit cost of 𝑝𝑖
𝑘; 𝑠𝑖
𝑘 = 0 when the flows into the demand node 
sum to 𝑏𝑖
𝑘. The unit cost of allocation resources for a node is 𝑞𝑖
𝑘 and the same quantity 
for a link is 𝑟𝑖𝑗
𝑘. 
Considering that some of the networks may be more critical to a community’s 
functionality, 𝜇𝑘 is used as a network importance factor; all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁
𝑘 have the same 𝜇𝑘. In 
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the example network system used for this research, the values of 𝜇𝑘 have been assigned 
to each of the networks randomly, but a more in-depth technique drawing from detailed 
knowledge of the networks and (such as Analytical Hierarchy Process) could determine 
weights that accurately reflect the situation and community needs. There are also node 
attributes that describe the importance of each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑘  to attackers and defenders. The 
SoVI rank (high, moderate, or low social vulnerability) 𝑣𝑖
𝑘 for each node is determined 
for the node’s geographical location in the area of study. Lastly, the attribute that 
describes the attacker’s attitude toward and desirability of each potential target is 
unknown by the defenders but is estimated with 𝛾𝑖
𝑘.  
3.4 Contest Function Simplification  
As previously stated, the difference form of contest functions, show in Eq. (1)-(2), is 
commonly applied to scenarios in which a defender is determining resource amounts to 
combat an intentional attack. The vulnerability of a node or link (𝑢𝑖
𝑘 and 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑘 , 
respectively) is calculated for some assumed attack resources 𝑔𝑖
𝑘 and ℎ𝑖𝑗
𝑘  and allocation 
of defense resources 𝑑𝑖
𝑘 and 𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑘 if the component is included in that attack scenario (if 
the value for the attack resources is greater than zero); if the component is not disrupted, 
its vulnerability is zero. The expected value for a component’s functionality in the 
disruption scenario can be estimated by multiplying its pre-disrupted value by 1-𝑢𝑖
𝑘 (for 
nodes) or by 1-𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑘  (for links). 
 
𝑢𝑖
𝑘(𝑔𝑖
𝑘, 𝑑𝑖
𝑘) = {
𝑒𝑔𝑖
𝑘
𝑒𝑔𝑖
𝑘
+ 𝑒𝑑𝑖
𝑘 𝑖𝑓 𝑔𝑖
𝑘 > 0 
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑔𝑖
𝑘 = 0
 (1) 
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𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑘 (ℎ𝑖𝑗
𝑘 , 𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑘) = {
𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑗
𝑘
+ 𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑘 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑖𝑗
𝑘 > 0 
0 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑖𝑗
𝑘 = 0
  
 
(2) 
This format, though, cannot be used in linear models; to keep the computation 
simple, this research uses a modified contest function that still calculates vulnerability 
as a function of the difference between attacker and defender resources. As seen in Eq. 
(3)-(4), if a defender does not allocate any resources to a component it is completely 
disrupted and its capacity is reduced to zero. If equal amounts of attack and defense 
resources are assigned to a component, the vulnerability is zero and the component’s 
capacity is unaffected. The condition still holds that if the amount of attack resources on 
a given component is zero, that component’s vulnerability is zero.  
 
 
𝑢𝑖
𝑘(𝑔𝑖
𝑘, 𝑑𝑖
𝑘) = {
𝑔𝑖
𝑘 − 𝑑𝑖
𝑘
𝑔𝑖
𝑘 𝑖𝑓 𝑔𝑖
𝑘 > 0 
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑔𝑖
𝑘 = 0
 (3) 
 
 
𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑘 (ℎ𝑖𝑗
𝑘 , 𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑘) = {
ℎ𝑖𝑗
𝑘 − 𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑘
ℎ𝑖𝑗
𝑘 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑖𝑗
𝑘 > 0 
0 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑖𝑗
𝑘 = 0
  
 
(4) 
 
3.5 Mathematical Model 
 
min
∑ ∑ 𝜇𝑘𝑣𝑖
𝑘𝑠𝑖
𝑘
𝑖∈𝑁𝑘𝑑𝑘∈𝐾
𝑆
  
 
(5) 
 min ∑ ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑘𝑑𝑖
𝑘 +
𝑖∈𝑁𝑘𝑘∈𝐾
∑ ∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑗
𝑘𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑖,𝑗∈𝐿𝑘𝑘∈𝐾
 (6) 
 
 
Subject to: 
 ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ≤ 𝑏𝑖
𝑘 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑘𝑠 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾
𝑖,𝑗∈𝐿𝑘
 (7) 
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 ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑘 − ∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑖
𝑘
𝑗,𝑖∈𝐿𝑘𝑖,𝑗∈𝐿𝑘
= 0, ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑘\{𝑁𝑘𝑠, 𝑁𝑘𝑑}, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (8) 
 ∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑖
𝑘 + 𝑠𝑖
𝑘 = 𝑏𝑖
𝑘 , ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑘𝑑 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾
𝑖,𝑗 ∈𝐿𝑘
 (9) 
 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑘 − 𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ≤ 0 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (10) 
  
𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑘 − (1 − 𝑢𝑖
𝑘)𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ≤ 0 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿𝑘 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑘′, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 
 
(11) 
 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑘 − (1 − 𝑢𝑗
𝑘)𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ≤ 0 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿𝑘, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑘′, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (12) 
  
𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑘 − (1 − 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑘 )𝑐𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ≤ 0 , ∀(𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐿𝑘′, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 
 
(13) 
 (1 − 𝑢𝑖̅
?̅?) − (1 − 𝑢𝑖
𝑘) ≤ 0 , ∀((𝑖, 𝑘), (𝑖,̅ ?̅?))  ∈ Ψ 
Alternatively (14) can be written as 𝑢𝑖
𝑘 − 𝑢𝑖̅
?̅? ≤ 0 , ∀((𝑖, 𝑘), (𝑖,̅ ?̅?))  ∈ Ψ 
 
(14) 
 
 
 𝑑𝑖
𝑘 ≥ 0  
 
(15) 
 𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ≥ 0  
 
(16) 
Objective (5) minimizes the total amount of weighted proportional slack across all 
networks, accounting for demand nodes in networks are more important to the decision 
makers and those that have less ability to recover from disruption. These weights 
encourage defensive resources to be first allocated to susceptible components whose 
removal would cause the most harm, functionally and socially. The quantity 
𝑆 represents the total amount of weighted slack that exists in the network system when 
no defensive resources have been allocated and the network performance had 
deteriorated its lowest point. The conflicting objective shown in Eq. (6) minimizes the 
total cost of the resource allocation strategy (𝒅, 𝒇), which is comprised of the amount of 
defensive resources selected to each of the nodes and links in the disruption scenario 
and the unit cost of the resource at each component. The unit cost is included in the 
objective, as opposed to looking at just the amount of resource used, to account for the 
fact that it may be more expensive to assign resources to one area over another. 
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Constraints (7)-(9) are the flow conservation constraints at each node: the flows 
𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑘  out of node 𝑖 cannot exceed the maximum possible flow 𝑏𝑖
𝑘; the sum of the flows 
out of node 𝑖 (𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑘 ) must be equal to the sum of the flows into node 𝑖 (𝑥𝑗𝑖
𝑘); and the total 
flow into a demand node 𝑖 (𝑥𝑗𝑖
𝑘) combined with the amount of slack (𝑠𝑖
𝑘) at that node 
must be equal to the demand (maximum performance). Constraint (10) ensures that the 
flow across any link is no more than the link capacity. Constraints (11) -(13) consider 
link capacity for disrupted components whose capacity has been reduced by a factor 
related to its vulnerability. The flow between nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗 cannot be greater than the 
disrupted performance level of either node, or the disrupted capacity of the link itself. 
The interdependency of the network system is described with constraint (14): if node 𝑖 ̅
in network ?̅? is dependent on node 𝑖 in network 𝑘, node 𝑖 ̅must be at least as vulnerable 
as node 𝑖. Finally, constraints (15) and (16) are nonnegativity constraints for the 
decision variables 𝑑𝑖
𝑘 and 𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑘; the amount of resources assigned to each component must 
be positive, though non-integer values are allowed.  
To simplify the computational aspects of the model, the 𝜖-constraint method 
developed by Haimes et al. (1971) is used; the first objective is constrained by a given 
value of 𝜖 representing the maximum allowable vulnerability, as seen in Eq. (17). 
∑ ∑ 𝜇𝑘𝑣𝑖
𝑘𝑠𝑖
𝑘
𝑖∈𝑁𝑘𝑑𝑘∈𝐾
𝑆
≤ 𝜖 (17) 
The second objective is still minimized and becomes the single-objective in the 
mathematical model so that the lowest cost strategy for a determined amount of 
weighted slack is found. Running the model with several values of 𝜖 across each of the 
disruption scenarios gives the set of Pareto-optimal solutions. In this research, nine 
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values of 𝜖 ∈ [0,1] were run for each disruption scenario for a total of 27 potential 
solutions.  
3.6 Solution Robustness 
Once the set of Pareto-optimal solutions has been found, each solution is evaluated to 
determine which is the most robust with respect to all three scenarios. Robustness in 
this instance is defined by how well a solution meets the objectives (specifically the first 
objective, as cost will remain the same for a given solution) when applied to the 
disruption scenarios for which it was not initially solved. To do this, each of the 
solutions 𝑦𝑚𝑛 in the Pareto-optimal set is run on each of the scenarios and the resulting 
values for vulnerability (weighted proportional slack) and cost are recorded. The data 
was then evaluated and ranked with TOPSIS, using the vulnerability associated with 
each scenario and the strategy cost as its four criteria.  
Because the criteria have different units, the data are first standardized using the 
formula shown in Eq. (18).  
𝑟𝑛𝑚(𝑦) =  
𝑦𝑛𝑚 − min
𝑛
𝑦𝑛𝑚
max
𝑛
𝑦𝑛𝑚 − min
𝑛
𝑦𝑛𝑚
 
 
(18) 
Next, weights are applied to the standardized values, seen in Eq. (19), so that more 
important criteria have greater influence on the solution ranking. Criteria can have equal 
weights, or the weights can be determined by stakeholders’ beliefs and preferences.  
𝑣𝑛𝑚(𝑦) = 𝑤𝑚𝑟𝑛𝑚(𝑦)  
 
(19) 
 
From the weighted scores the Positive Ideal Solution (PIS) and Negative Ideal Solution 
(NIS) are found; these represent the best-case (minimum value) scenario and the worst-
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case (maximum value) scenario, respectively, in each of the criteria. The formulas for 
calculating these two values are shown in Eq. (20) and Eq. (21).  
𝑃𝐼𝑆 = 𝐴+ = {𝑣1
+(𝑦), … , 𝑣𝑚
+(𝑦), … , 𝑣𝑀
+ (𝑦)}  
 
(20) 
𝑁𝐼𝑆 = 𝐴− = {𝑣1
−(𝑦), … , 𝑣𝑚
−(𝑦), … , 𝑣𝑀
−(𝑦)}  (21) 
 
 
The distance of each candidate solution to the PIS and NIS are found using the 
Euclidian distance function in Eq. (22) and (23). 
𝐷𝑛
+ = √ ∑ [𝑣𝑛𝑚(𝑦) − 𝑣𝑚
+(𝑦)]2
𝑀
𝑚=1
∀ 𝑛 = 1 … 𝑁  
 
(22) 
𝐷𝑛
− = √ ∑ [𝑣𝑛𝑚(𝑦) − 𝑣𝑚−(𝑦)]2
𝑀
𝑚=1
∀ 𝑛 = 1 … 𝑁  
 
 
 
(23) 
 
The last step in TOPSIS combines the two distance measures into a single closeness 
coefficient using Eq. (24).  
𝑆𝑛
+ =
𝐷𝑛
−
𝐷𝑛
+ + 𝐷𝑛−
  
 
(24) 
The coefficients are ranked to determine which defensive strategy is most similar to the 
ideal solution and least similar to the worst solution. (Hwang et al., 1993). Larger 
coefficients represent strategies that are closer, based on Euclidean distance, to the PIS 
and furthest from the NIS.  
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Chapter 4: Illustrative Example: Shelby County, Tennessee 
This section details an application of the above methodology on a critical infrastructure 
system in Tennessee and discusses the results of the model. 
4.1 Critical Infrastructure System 
The data used in this research is from a set of three interdependent networks in Shelby 
County, TN, taken from González et al. (2015). The water, gas, and power networks are 
shown below in Figures 2-4, respectively. The system is comprised of three 
interdependent networks with a total of 125 nodes and 328 links. The number of nodes 
and links in each network, and how many of these nodes are dependent on a node in a 
different network, are shown in Table 1. 
 
 
Figure 2: Water network in Shelby County 
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Figure 3: Gas network in Shelby County 
 
 
Figure 4: Power network in Shelby County 
 
Table 1:  Network properties of the Shelby County system 
Network Total 
Nodes 
Supply 
Nodes 
Demand 
Nodes 
Total 
Links 
Interdependent 
Links 
Water 49 34 15 142 46 
Gas 16 2 13 34 0 
Power 60 37 23 152 46 
 
4.2 Social Vulnerability by Block Group 
The SoVI scores are calculated at the block group level for Shelby County using the 
SoVI-Lite methodology developed for the Mississippi Valley Region, in which the 
county resides. Due to the high margin of error in US Census data at the block group 
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level, the exact SoVI scores have a low degree of accuracy the therefore generalized 
categories of Low, Moderate, and High social vulnerability (ranks of 1,2 and 3, 
respectively), are used instead. These are found by standardizing the scores and 
assigning a rank of 1 to block groups for which 𝑧 ≤ −0.5, a rank of 2 to block groups 
for which −0.5 < 𝑧 < 0.5 and a rank of 3 to block groups for which 𝑧 ≥ 0.5. The final 
distribution of social vulnerability in the county is 31% low, 47% moderate, and 22% 
high social vulnerability.  
4.3 Numerical and Graphical Results 
To be able to calculate weighted proportional slack, the model was run for each 
scenario with 𝜖=1 so total vulnerability was allowed and no resources would be 
allocated. Table 2 shows this “no allocation” state for each scenario, where Total Cost is 
the sum of allocation costs (which have been forced to zero in this run) and of the costs 
of unmet demands, as shown in Eq. (25). 
𝑇 = ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑘𝑠𝑖
𝑘
𝑖∈𝑁𝑘𝑘∈𝐾
+ ∑ ∑ 𝑞𝑖
𝑘𝑑𝑖
𝑘 +
𝑖∈𝑁𝑘𝑘∈𝐾
∑ ∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑗
𝑘𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑖,𝑗∈𝐿𝑘𝑘∈𝐾
 
 
(25) 
 Understandably, the desirability-based attacks results in the lowest total cost and slack 
because the components targeted may not have contributed significantly to meeting 
demand but instead are associated with costs of a less quantifiable nature. The total cost 
and slack for the capacity- and degree-based attacks are similar. 
Table 2: Cost and slack in disrupted networks with no allocation. 
Scenario Total Cost Total 
Slack 
Slack: Water 
Network 
Slack: Gas 
Network 
Slack: Power 
Network 
Desirability $1,072,500 2145 357 1000 788 
Capacity $1,384,000 2768 546 1000 1222 
Degree $1,357,694 2715 921 586 1208 
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The Pareto-optimal frontier in Figure 5 shows the competing objective 
functions’ values for each of the nine solutions found for each disruption scenario. As 
expected, the more money that goes toward allocation the lower the slack (lower 
vulnerability). While the capacity-based scenario has higher costs at the lowest values 
of weighted proportional slack, the costs are similar for values over approximately 0.25. 
Furthermore, the overall shape of the curves is very similar for each scenario; going 
from a slack of 1.0 to 0.50 does not require huge expenditure but from 0.10 to 0.0 the 
cost jump, indicating that the additional funds required may not be worth the slight 
decrease in slack. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once the model was run for each value of 𝜖 on each of the disruption scenarios, it was 
slightly reformatted so the solution values—the allocation amount at each component—
were treated as inputs for the other two scenarios. This yielded the data seen in Figures 
6-8. The desirability-based solutions appear to be largely ineffective in the capacity- 
and degree-based disruptions; except for the initial jump from “no allocation” to “some 
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Figure 5: Pareto-optimal front for cost and vulnerability objectives 
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allocation” between slack values of 1.0 and 0.85, the increase in allocation cost does not 
noticeably decrease the system vulnerability.  
The capacity-based solutions offer a slight improvement over those for the 
desirability-based scenario. The weighted proportional slack for the degree-based 
scenario decreases more than that of the desirability-based scenario as costs increase, 
but the system remains between 40%-60% vulnerable. With the degree-based solutions, 
the desirability-based scenario is practically entirely unaffected, though the capacity-
based scenario responds to the solutions almost as well as the degree-based scenario did 
with the capacity-based solutions. This indicates that there may be more overlap in the 
set of disrupted components between the capacity- and degree-based disruption 
scenarios than with the degree-based disruption scenarios.  
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4.4 Robustness Ranking 
From the graphs above, capacity-based solutions seem to outperform degree-based 
solutions, and both are far better than the desirability-based solutions. This conclusion is 
confirmed in the TOPSIS evaluation in Table 3, as all the highest ranked defensive 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
A
llo
ca
ti
o
n
 C
o
st
 in
 T
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s 
o
f 
D
o
lla
rs
Weighted Proportional Slack
Allocation Cost vs Total Slack: Degree-based 
Solutions
Desirability
Capacity
Degree
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
A
llo
ca
ti
o
n
 C
o
st
 in
 T
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s 
o
f 
D
o
lla
rs
Weighted Proportional Slack
Allocation Cost vs Total Slack: Capacity-based 
Solutions
Desirability
Capacity
Degree
Figure 7: Robustness of capacity-based solutions on cost and vulnerability objectives 
Figure 8: Robustness of degree-based solutions on cost and vulnerability objectives 
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strategies are from those two solution sets. However, none of the strategies are able to 
adequately decrease vulnerability across more than one disruption scenario. This can 
likely be attributed to high distinction between the sets of components targeted; even 
when the vulnerability is reduced to 0.10 or 0.05 for one scenario, indicating that nearly 
all the disrupted components have sufficient resources, the disrupted components for 
another scenario remain highly vulnerable.  
In the TOPSIS results, the trade-off between reducing slack and reducing cost is 
clearly seen. For example, the Cap-6 strategy is ranked higher than Cap-7 strategy even 
though the slack is lower for both the capacity-based and degree-based scenarios. The 
allocation cost in the latter is too high to justify the relatively small decreases.  
Table 3: Top eight solutions based on TOPSIS rankings; strategies are named by the scenario for and the 
run order in which they were originally solved 
Strategy S+ Rank Desirability-
based 
Scenario 
Capacity-
based 
Scenario 
Degree-
based 
Scenario 
Allocation 
Cost 
Cap – 6 0.458 1 0.66 0.10 0.53 $219,412 
Cap – 5 0.443 2 0.69 0.25 0.59 $120,742 
Cap – 7 0.439 3 0.66 0.05 0.49 $284,316 
Deg – 6 0.437 4 0.75 0.58 0.10 $179,294 
Deg – 7 0.437 5 0.75 0.56 0.05 $214,064 
Cap – 4 0.421 6 0.70 0.33 0.61 $91,527 
Deg – 4 0.418 7 0.76 0.56 0.33 $93,442 
Deg – 5 0.415 8 0.75 0.61 0.25 $116,208 
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Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks 
5.1 Discussion 
In summary, the differences between the disruption scenarios made finding a truly 
robust solution difficult. Nevertheless, the methodology discussed in this work does 
provide a framework for comparing the effectiveness of allocation strategies for attacks 
on an interdependent network system. Additionally, it offers one way to include social 
vulnerability into disaster planning, a crucial component for which many previous 
works do not account. The resilience of both the infrastructure and of the community 
must be incorporated in disaster planning so that if a disruption should occur the system 
will be optimally fortified at its weakest points. While protecting critical infrastructure 
networks is undeniably important, it does little good if they are still susceptible to attack 
in the areas in which people most depend on them.  
5.2 Limitations and Future Work 
In the course of this research, multiple limitations and opportunities for continuing 
improvements and expansions were identified. First, the overall accuracy of the model 
can be increased by gaining a better understanding of the component attributes, such as 
the cost of resource allocation, understanding which factors are more important to 
attacker target selection, and the degree to which the network components have these 
factors. The latter two are obviously more complicated to achieve as they require deeper 
understanding into attacker psychology and motivation.  
Secondly, using a non-linear contest function may have different results. A 
comparison of methods using the simplified contest function from this work and using 
the more common difference or ratio forms could help determine if the added 
complication from the non-linear function contributed to significantly better results.  
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Thirdly, weights based of off the likelihood of each attack scenario or the 
stakeholders’ preferences for one criterion over another could be incorporated into the 
TOPSIS calculations using the Analytical Hierarchy Process or similar technique. For 
example, if defenders have information prior to an intentional attack that a degree-based 
attack is more likely than a desirability- or capacity-based attack, the weights used in 
TOPSIS could reflect this information and influence the higher ranked strategies to 
include those that best protected the network in degree-based disruption scenarios. 
Defenders may also consider vulnerability reduction more important than cost, or vice-
versa. Even if the probability of a disruption is relatively low, there are non-monetary 
costs, like decreased sense of security in the public or loss of trust in the government, 
that would occur in the event of a successful malevolent attack. If defenders are more 
concerned with these qualitative costs than the quantitative costs of resource allocation, 
the vulnerability criteria can be weighted higher than the cost criterion to allow 
strategies with high costs but less damage to the networks to be ranked high. These 
changes would help represent the reality of the situation more accurately and could 
incorporate opinions of the community, governmental bodies, and infrastructure 
workers.  
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Appendix A Network Allocation Model 
This section shows the code used to define the network attributes and solve the network 
allocation mathematical model. The data was read in from Excel and the model was 
written and solved with Python 2.7 and Gurobi 7.5.1. 
# Resilience-Driven Allocation Model for Interdependent Infrastructure Networks   
# Adapted from Almoghathawi et al, 2016     
#Packages   
import pandas as pd   
import numpy as np   
import math   
from math import exp   
from gurobipy import *   
import xlsxwriter   
 
# DATA:   
nodes  = pd.DataFrame(pd.read_csv('Shelby full - nodes - Copy7.csv',header='infer')) 
supply = pd.DataFrame(pd.read_csv('Shelby full - supply - Copy3.csv',header='infer')) 
demand = pd.DataFrame(pd.read_csv('Shelby full - demand - Copy3.csv',header='infer')) 
links  = pd.DataFrame(pd.read_csv('Shelby full - links - Copy7.csv', header='infer'))
   
dis_n=pd.DataFrame(pd.read_csv('Shelby full - nodes - Copy4 - dis.10.csv',header='inf
er') dis_l=pd.DataFrame(pd.read_csv('Shelby full - links - Copy4 - dis.10.csv',header
='infer'))depend 
=pd.DataFrame(pd.read_csv('Shelby full - dependency - Copy1.csv',header='infer'))   
 
#List of nodes   
node = nodes['node'].values.ravel().tolist()   
node = list(map(int,node))   
 
#List of nodes and networks   
IK =  list(zip(nodes['node'], nodes['net.n']))     
nodes['IK']  = IK   
Shelby_n_dic = nodes.set_index('IK').to_dict()   
IK = [t for t in IK if not any(isinstance(n, float) and math.isnan(n) for n in t)] #n
ote to self: what does this line mean    
IK = tuplelist(IK)   
   
#List of links and networks   
IJK =  list(zip(links['from'], links['to'], links['net.l']))     
links['IJK'] = IJK   
Shelby_l_dic = links.set_index('IJK').to_dict()   
IJK = [t for t in IJK if not any(isinstance(n, float) and math.isnan(n) for n in t)] 
  
IJK = tuplelist(IJK)   
   
#List if interdependent nodes   
IKJL =  list(zip(depend['node1'], depend['net1'], depend['node2'], depend['net2']))  
  
depend['IKJL'] = IKJL   
Shelby_d_dic   = depend.set_index('IKJL').to_dict()   
IKJL = [t for t in IKJL if not any(isinstance(n, float) and math.isnan(n) for n in t)
]   
IKJL = tuplelist(IKJL)   
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# SUPPLY AND DEMAND: ------------------------------------------------------------- 
#Supply nodes   
IK_S =  list(zip(supply['node'], supply['net.n']))     
supply['IK_S']  = IK_S   
Shelby_sup_dic = supply.set_index('IK_S').to_dict()   
IK_S = [t for t in IK_S if not any(isinstance(n, float)and math.isnan(n) for n in t)] 
IK_S = tuplelist(IK_S)   
   
#Demand nodes   
IK_D =  list(zip(demand['node'], demand['net.n']))     
demand['IK_D']  = IK_D   
Shelby_dem_dic = demand.set_index('IK_D').to_dict()   
IK_D = [t for t in IK_D if not any(isinstance(n, float)and math.isnan(n) for n in t)] 
IK_D = tuplelist(IK_D)   
   
# DISRUPTED COMPONENTS:---------------------------------------------------------- 
#Disrupted nodes   
DIK =  list(zip(dis_n['node'], dis_n['net.n']))     
dis_n['DIK']  = DIK   
Shelby_dn_dic = dis_n.set_index('DIK').to_dict()   
DIK = [t for t in DIK if not any(isinstance(n, float) and math.isnan(n) for n in t)] 
  
DIK = tuplelist(DIK)   
   
#Disrupted links   
DIJK =  list(zip(dis_l['from'], dis_l['to'], dis_l['net.l']))  #list of links with th
eir network   
dis_l['DIJK'] = DIJK   
Shelby_dl_dic = dis_l.set_index('DIJK').to_dict()   
DIJK = [t for t in DIJK if not any(isinstance(n, float)and math.isnan(n) for n in t)] 
DIJK = tuplelist(DIJK)   
     
#NODE AND LINK ATTRIBUTES:-------------------------------------------------------  
sup   = {} #Supply   
dem   = {} #Demand   
sovi  = {} #Social vulnerability rank   
ext_n = {} #Target desirability of node   
ext_l = {} #Target desirability of link   
imp   = {} #Network weight   
rc_n = {} #Unit restoration cost of node   
rc_l = {} #Unit resoration cost of link   
p     = {} #Unit cost of unmet demand   
enode = {} #Attack resources dedicated to node   
elink = {} #Attack resources dedicated to link   
cap  = {} #Capacity of link   
   
for i,k in IK_S:   
      sup[i,k]  = Shelby_sup_dic['supply'][i,k]   
   
for i,k in IK_D:   
      dem[i,k]  = Shelby_dem_dic['demand'][i,k]   
      imp[i,k]  = Shelby_dem_dic['imp'][i,k]   
      sovi[i,k] = Shelby_dem_dic['sovi'][i,k]   
   
for i,k in IK:   
      p[i,k]     = Shelby_n_dic['p'][i,k]   
      #fn[i,k]   = Shelby_n_dic['fn'][i,k]   
      ext_n[i,k] = Shelby_n_dic['ext_n'][i,k]   
      enode[i,k] = Shelby_n_dic['enode10'][i,k]  
      rc_n[i,k] = Shelby_n_dic['rc_n'][i,k]           
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for i,j,k in IJK:   
      cap[i,j,k]   = Shelby_l_dic['cap'][i,j,k]   
      #cf[i,j,k]   = Shelby_l_dic['cf'][i,j,k]   
      #fl[i,j,k]   = Shelby_l_dic['fl'][i,j,k]   
      ext_l[i,j,k] = Shelby_l_dic['ext_l'][i,j,k]   
      elink[i,j,k] = Shelby_l_dic['elink10'][i,j,k]  
      rc_l[i,j,k] = Shelby_l_dic['rc_l'][i,j,k]     
               
#Interdependent networks:   
network = (1,2,3)   
     
#Weighted slack in each disruption scenario with no allocation   
TotWSlack=1444.56 #Desirability-based scenario   
#TotWSlack=1837.44 #Capacity-based scenario   
#TotWSlack=1956.03 #Degree-based scenario   
   
m = Model('Resilience Optimization')   
   
# VARIABLES:---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
hnode={} #Defensive resource allocation for nodes - decision variable   
for i,k in IK:   
      hnode[i,k]=m.addVar(lb=0.0,vtype=GRB.CONTINUOUS,name='hnode_%s_%s'%(i,k))   
         
hlink = {} #Defensive resource allocation for links - decision variable   
for i,j,k in IJK:   
      hlink[i,j,k] = m.addVar(lb=0.0,vtype=GRB.CONTINUOUS, name='hlink_%s_%s_%s'%(i,j
,k))  
   
v_n = {} #Vulnerability of node given the proposed attack/defense scenario   
for i,k in IK:   
      v_n[i,k] = m.addVar(vtype=GRB.CONTINUOUS,name='v_n_%s_%s'%(i,k))   
   
v_l = {} #Vulnerability of link given the proposed attack/defense scenario   
for i,j,k in IJK:   
      v_l[i,j,k] = m.addVar(vtype=GRB.CONTINUOUS,name='v_l_%s_%s_%s'%(i,j,k))   
     
F = {} #Flow   
for i,j,k  in IJK:   
      F[i,j,k] = m.addVar(ub=cap[i,j,k], name='F_%s_%s_%s'%(i,j,k))   
   
SU = {} #Unmet demand   
for i,k in IK_D:   
      SU[i,k] = m.addVar(ub=dem[i,k], name='SU_%s_%s'%(i,k))   
   
SSU = {} #Total slack in each network   
for k in network:   
      SSU[k] = m.addVar(name='SSU_%s'%(k))   
   
WS = {} #Total weighted slack in each network   
for k in network:   
      WS[k] = m.addVar(name='WS_%s'%(k))   
               
m.update()            
              
# CONSTRAINTS:-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
# 1. CONSERVATION CONSTRAINTS OF FLOW AT NODE i:   
for i,k in IK_S:   
      m.addConstr(quicksum(F[i,j,k] for i,j,k in IJK.select(i,'*',k)) -   
                  quicksum(F[j,i,k] for j,i,k in IJK.select('*', i,k)) <= sup[i,k])  
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for i,k in IK_D:   
      m.addConstr(quicksum(F[i,j,k] for i,j,k in IJK.select(i,'*',k)) -   
            quicksum(F[j,i,k] for j,i,k in IJK.select('*', i,k)) - SU[i,k] == -
dem[i,k])   
            
# 2. CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS ON LINK (I,J):    
for i,k in DIK:   
      m.addConstr(v_n[i,k] == ((enode[i,k]-hnode[i,k])/enode[i,k]))   
   
for i,j,k in DIJK:   
      m.addConstr(v_l[i,j,k] == ((elink[i,j,k]-hlink[i,j,k])/elink[i,j,k]))   
         
for i,j,k in IJK:   
    m.addConstr(F[i,j,k] <= cap[i,j,k] * (1-v_n[i,k])) 
   
for i,j,k in IJK:    
    m.addConstr(F[i,j,k] <= cap[i,j,k] * (1-v_n[j,k])) 
     
for i,j,k in DIJK:   
    m.addConstr(F[i,j,k] <= cap[i,j,k] * (1-v_l[i,j,k]))  
   
   
# 3. INTERDEPENDENCE CONSTRAINST:             
for i,k,j,l in IKJL:    
      m.addConstr(v_n[i,k] >= v_n[j,l])   
   
#Total slack in each network    
for k in network:   
      m.addConstr(SSU[k] == quicksum(SU[i,k] for i,k in IK_D.select('*',k)))   
   
#Weighted slack in each network   
for k in network:   
      WS[k] = quicksum(sovi[i,k]*imp[i,k]*SU[i,k] for i,k in IK_D.select('*',k))   
         
# OBJECTIVE FUNCTION:  ---------------------------------------------------------   
#OBJECTIVE I: MINIMIZE SLACK:  
S_total=(quicksum(sovi[i,k]*imp[i,k]*SU[i,k] for i,k in IK_D))/TotWSlack #Proportiona
l weighted slack 
epsilon=1 
m.addConstr(S_total <= epsilon) #Epsilon constraint   
 
m.update()   
   
# OBJECTIVE II: MINIMIZE THE ALLOCATION COST:   
NRC = quicksum( rc_n[i,k]*hnode[i,k] for i,k in DIK)   #Node resource allocation cost 
LRC = quicksum( rc_l[i,j,k]*hlink[i,j,k] for i,j,k in DIJK) #Link resource allocation
 cost 
UDC = quicksum( p[i,k] * SU[i,k] for i,k in IK_D)  #Unmet demand cost at demand nodes 
Alloc=NRC+LRC  #Total allocation costs 
COST=NRC+LRC+UDC #Total allocation and slack costs 
   
m.update()   
   
m.setObjective(Alloc, GRB.MINIMIZE)   
   
m.modelSense = GRB.MINIMIZE   
m.optimize()   
status = m.status   
   
m.write('Resilience Optimization.lp')   
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if m.status == GRB.Status.OPTIMAL:   
    print('Optimal cost objective: %g' % m.objVal)   
elif m.status == GRB.Status.INF_OR_UNBD:   
    print('Model is infeasible or unbounded')   
    exit(0)   
elif m.status == GRB.Status.INFEASIBLE:   
    print('Model is infeasible')   
    exit(0)   
elif m.status == GRB.Status.UNBOUNDED:   
    print('Model is unbounded')   
    exit(0)   
else:   
    print('Optimization ended with status %d' % m.status)   
    exit(0)   
   
solution  = m.getAttr('x',SSU)   
   
for k in network:   
        if solution[k]>0:    
              print('SSU[%s] = %g'%(k,solution[k]))   
   
print 'The runtime is'   
print m.Runtime   
print 'The total cost is'    
print COST.getValue()   
print 'The total allocation cost is'   
print Alloc.getValue()   
print 'The total weighted proportional slack is'   
print S_total.getValue()   
print 'The total unmet demand is'   
print SSU[1]   
print SSU[2]   
print SSU[3]   
print 'The weighted slack in each network is'   
print WS[1].getValue()   
print WS[2].getValue()   
print WS[3].getValue()   
   
#Write out current solution to file   
node_i=[]   
node_k=[]   
node_h=[]   
for i,k in IK:   
      node_i.append(i)   
      node_k.append(k)   
      node_h.append(hnode[i,k].X)   
nodedata={'Node':node_i,'Network':node_k,'hnode':node_h}   
dataframe=pd.DataFrame(nodedata,columns=['Node','Network','hnode'])   
writer=pd.ExcelWriter('hnode.xlsx',engine='xlsxwriter')   
dataframe.to_excel(writer,sheet_name='Sheet1')   
writer.save()   
   
link_i=[]   
link_j=[]   
link_k=[]   
link_h=[]   
for i,j,k in IJK:   
      link_i.append(i)   
      link_j.append(j)   
      link_k.append(k)   
      link_h.append(hlink[i,j,k].X)   
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linkdata={'Node1':link_i,'Node2':link_j,'Network':link_k,'hlink':link_h}   
dataframe=pd.DataFrame(linkdata,columns=['Node1','Node2','Network','hlink'])   
writer=pd.ExcelWriter('hlink.xlsx',engine='xlsxwriter')   
dataframe.to_excel(writer,sheet_name='Sheet1')   
writer.save()   
                 
print('The optimal objective is %g' % m.objVal) 
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Appendix B Network Allocation Model for Robustness 
This section shows the code from Appendix A rewritten to apply the found solutions to 
the other two scenarios for which it was not originally solved. Only the sections of code 
that required changes are shown here. 
# NODE AND LINK ATTRIBUTES:------------------------------------------------------- 
sup   = {} #supply at node i   
dem   = {} #demand at node i   
sovi  = {} #social vulnerability score at node i   
ext_n = {} #external importance at node i (importance to attacker)   
ext_l = {} #external importance at link i,j (importance to attacker)   
imp   = {} #network importance for node i (importance to defender)   
rc_n = {} #unit restoration cost for nodes   
rc_l = {} #unit resoration cost for links   
p     = {} #unit cost of unmet demand, slack cost   
enode = {} #attack resources dedicated to node i   
elink = {} #attack resources dedicated to link i   
cap  = {} #Capacity of the links   
 
#hnode and hlink are read in as attributes and are not solved as decision variables 
hnode = {} #defense resources dedicated to node i 
hlink = {} #defense resources dedicated to link i   
   
for i,k in IK_S:   
      sup[i,k]  = Shelby_sup_dic['supply'][i,k]   
   
for i,k in IK_D:   
      dem[i,k]  = Shelby_dem_dic['demand'][i,k]   
      imp[i,k]  = Shelby_dem_dic['imp'][i,k]   
      sovi[i,k] = Shelby_dem_dic['sovi'][i,k]   
   
for i,k in IK:   
      p[i,k]     = Shelby_n_dic['p'][i,k]   
      ext_n[i,k] = Shelby_n_dic['ext_n'][i,k]   
      enode[i,k] = Shelby_n_dic['enode11'][i,k] #change based on dis#   
      hnode[i,k] = Shelby_n_dic['hnode128'][i,k] #change based on dis#   
      rc_n[i,k] = Shelby_n_dic['rc_n'][i,k]   
              
for i,j,k in IJK:   
      cap[i,j,k]   = Shelby_l_dic['cap'][i,j,k]   
      ext_l[i,j,k] = Shelby_l_dic['ext_l'][i,j,k]   
      elink[i,j,k] = Shelby_l_dic['elink11'][i,j,k] #change based on dis#   
      hlink[i,j,k] = Shelby_l_dic['hlink128'][i,j,k] #change based on dis#   
      rc_l[i,j,k] = Shelby_l_dic['rc_l'][i,j,k]   
   
#Interdependent networks:   
network = (1,2,3)   
   
#Weighted slack in each disruption scenario with no allocation   
TotWSlack=1444.56 #Desirability-based scenario   
#TotWSlack=1837.44 #Capacity-based scenario   
#TotWSlack=1956.03 #Degree-based scenario   
   
m = Model('Resilience Optimization')   
   
# VARIABLES:---------------------------------------------------------------------  
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v_n = {} #Vulnerability of node given the proposed attack/defense scenario   
for i,k in IK:   
      v_n[i,k] = m.addVar(vtype=GRB.CONTINUOUS,lb=0,ub=1,name='v_n_%s_%s'%(i,k))   
   
v_l = {} #Vulnerability of link given the proposed attack/defense scenario   
for i,j,k in IJK:   
      v_l[i,j,k]=m.addVar(vtype=GRB.CONTINUOUS,lb=0,ub=1,name='v_l_%s_%s_%s'%(i,j,k)) 
     
F = {} #Flow   
for i,j,k  in IJK:   
      F[i,j,k] = m.addVar(ub=cap[i,j,k], name='F_%s_%s_%s'%(i,j,k))   
   
SU = {} #Unmet demand   
for i,k in IK_D:   
      SU[i,k] = m.addVar(ub=dem[i,k], name='SU_%s_%s'%(i,k))   
   
SSU = {} #Total slack in each network   
for k in network:   
      SSU[k] = m.addVar(name='SSU_%s'%(k))   
   
WS = {} #Total weighted slack in each network   
for k in network:   
      WS[k] = m.addVar(name='WS_%s'%(k))   
               
m.update()            
   
#CONSTRAINTS:--------------------------------------------------------------------  
#1. CONSERVATION CONSTRAINTS OF FLOW AT NODE i:   
for i,k in IK_S:   
      m.addConstr(quicksum(F[i,j,k] for i,j,k in IJK.select(i,'*',k)) -   
                  quicksum(F[j,i,k] for j,i,k in IJK.select('*', i,k)) <= sup[i,k])   
   
for i,k in IK_D:   
      m.addConstr(quicksum(F[i,j,k] for i,j,k in IJK.select(i,'*',k)) -   
            quicksum(F[j,i,k] for j,i,k in IJK.select('*', i,k)) - SU[i,k] == -
dem[i,k])   
            
# 2. CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS ON LINK (I,J):    
for i,j,k in IJK:   
      m.addConstr(F[i,j,k]<= cap[i,j,k])   
   
for i,k in DIK:   
      m.addConstr(v_n[i,k] >= ((enode[i,k]-hnode[i,k])/enode[i,k]))   
   
for i,j,k in DIJK:   
      m.addConstr(v_l[i,j,k] >= ((elink[i,j,k]-hlink[i,j,k])/elink[i,j,k]))   
   
for i,j,k in IJK:   
    m.addConstr(F[i,j,k] <= cap[i,j,k] * (1-v_n[i,k])) #flow on link ij< (13-2)   
   
   
for i,j,k in IJK:    
    m.addConstr(F[i,j,k] <= cap[i,j,k] * (1-v_n[j,k])) #flow on link ij<(14-2)   
   
   
for i,j,k in DIJK:   
    m.addConstr(F[i,j,k] <= cap[i,j,k] * (1-v_l[i,j,k])) #(15-2)   
   
# 3. INTERDEPENDENCE CONSTRAINST:                      
for i,k,j,l in IKJL:    
      m.addConstr(v_n[i,k] >= v_n[j,l])   
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#Total slack in each network    
for k in network:   
      m.addConstr(SSU[k] == quicksum(SU[i,k] for i,k in IK_D.select('*',k)))   
   
#Weighted slack in each network   
for k in network:   
      WS[k] = quicksum(sovi[i,k]*imp[i,k]*SU[i,k] for i,k in IK_D.select('*',k))   
   
#OBJECTIVE FUNCTION: MINIMIZE SLACK:   
#Proportional weighted slack   
S_total=(quicksum(sovi[i,k]*imp[i,k]*SU[i,k] for i,k in IK_D))/TotWSlack  
m.update()   
 
NRC = quicksum( rc_n[i,k]*hnode[i,k] for i,k in IK)  #Node resource allocation cost 
LRC = quicksum( rc_l[i,j,k]*hlink[i,j,k] 
for i,j,k in IJK) #Link resource allocation cost  
UDC = quicksum( p[i,k] * SU[i,k] for i,k in IK_D)  #Unmet demand cost at demand nodes 
Alloc=NRC+LRC #Total allocation costs   
COST=NRC+LRC+UDC #Total allocation and slack costs   
   
m.update()   
   
m.setObjective(S_total, GRB.MINIMIZE)   
   
m.modelSense = GRB.MINIMIZE   
m.optimize()   
status = m.status   
   
m.write('Resilience Optimization.lp')   
   
if m.status == GRB.Status.OPTIMAL:   
    print('Optimal cost objective: %g' % m.objVal)   
elif m.status == GRB.Status.INF_OR_UNBD:   
    print('Model is infeasible or unbounded')   
    exit(0)   
elif m.status == GRB.Status.INFEASIBLE:   
    print('Model is infeasible')   
    exit(0)   
elif m.status == GRB.Status.UNBOUNDED:   
    print('Model is unbounded')   
    exit(0)   
else:   
    print('Optimization ended with status %d' % m.status)   
    exit(0)   
   
solution  = m.getAttr('x',SSU)   
   
for k in network:   
        if solution[k]>0:    
              print('SSU[%s] = %g'%(k,solution[k]))   
   
print 'The runtime is'   
print m.Runtime   
print 'the total cost is'    
print COST.getValue()   
print 'the total allocation cost is'   
print Alloc   
print 'The total weighted proportional slack is'   
print S_total.getValue()   
print 'The total unmet demand is'   
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print SSU[1]   
print SSU[2]   
print SSU[3]   
print 'The weighted slack in each network is'   
print WS[1].getValue()   
print WS[2].getValue()   
print WS[3].getValue()   
print('The optimal objective is %g' % m.objVal)   
 
 
 
